"The impression of intention is only in the watcher's mind." (NB: Compare this statement to Braitenberg!) So, when does an agent *really* have a goal? Minsky identifies two characteristics -- persistence, and the internal representation of the goal. "The idea of a difference-engine embodies both elements: a representation of some outcome and a mechanism to make it persist until that outcome is achieved."
But is this really a goal? Minsky (correctly) points out -- and I suspect that Braitenberg would too -- that it doesn't matter, because it is a very practical description. "The difference-engine scheme remains the most useful conception of goal, purpose, or intention yet discovered."
(NB: This makes me think a lot about the theme developed in Braitenberg's Vehicles. Is "goal" much more complicated from the uphill road of analysis? Minsky seems to be echoing that view here.)
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