We are not introspectively aware of how we think. "If we could really sense the workings of our minds [...] we wouldn't have such varied and conflicting theories for psychology."
"Many people seem absolutely certain that no computer could ever be sentient, conscious, self-willed, or in any other way `aware' of itself. But what makes everyoje so sure that they themselves possess those admirable qualities?" In other words, people don't really have much insight into why they differ from machines -- the evidence for self awareness is really weak.
(NB: Again, I sense an argument against the lay view of mentality that is based on casual introspection. It doesn't reveal the way that the mind actually works (which, of course, Minsky views as a society of agents). Question: Will Minsky provide better, or at least alternative, evidence for this position?)
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