5.3 The Remote-Control Self


Standard (lay) view of psychology is what Dennett would call the Cartesian theatre. But such a concept fails because of the homunculus problem. "This concept simply doesn't work. It cannot help for you to think that inside yourself lies someone else who does your work. [...] The idea of a single, central Self doesn't explain anything. This is because a thing with no parts provides nothing that we can use as pieces of explanation."

So why do we so readily accept such flawed answers? "Because so much of what our minds do is hidden from the parts of us that are involved with verbal consciousness."

The theme that is introduced here is that the lay view of Self is doomed, because it leads to circular problems. Indeed, much of Chapter 5 appears to be Minsky's attempt to drive a wedge into our confidence in this lay view, so that he has some chance of an alternative view taking hold.


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