We don't have a good definition of self, and "it often does more harm than good to force definitions on things we don't understand."
Minsky goes on to argue that a constructive approach to such definitional issues is to try to learn something about why our old (and wrong) notions about the mind were believed. "When we do this, it shows us that we do not have one such idea [about what the Self is], but many." This is another recurring theme -- multiplicity of ideas. Does Minsky depend on this result, available from introspection, to motivate his notion of multiple agents?
Self-images are defined as beliefs about what we are capable of doing, an about what we may be disposed to do. "We exploit these beliefs whenever we solve problems or make plans. [...] Our ideas about ourselves also include ideas about what we'd like to be and ideas about what we ought to be." So Minsky distinguishes between self-images and self-ideals, the former related to short (and long) range planning, the latter related to long-range goals for self.
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